We present a new proposal for a trapdoor one-way function, from which w e derive public-key encryption and digital signatures. The security of the new construction is based on the conjectured computational di culty of lattice-reduction problems, providing a possible alternative to existing public-key encryption algorithms and digital signatures such as RSA and DSS.
Introduction
The need for public-key encryption and digital signatures is spreading rapidly today as more people use computer networks to exchange con dential documents, buy products and access sensitive data. In fact, several of these tasks are impossible to achieve without the availability of good secure and e cient public-key cryptography.
In light of the importance of public key cryptography, it is surprising that there are relatively few proposals of public key cryptosystems which h a v e received any attention. Moreover, the source of security of these proposals almost always relies on the apparent computational intractability of problems in nite integer rings, speci cally integer factorization and discrete logarithm computations. In this paper we propose a new public key encryption algorithm and digital signature scheme whose security relies on the computational di culty of lattice reduction problems, in particular the problem of nding closest vectors in a lattice to a given point CVP. For comparison with existing schemes, we rst quickly review some of the most famous public-key encryption and digital signatures proposals, with emphasis on the computational problems their security is based on.
Previous proposals
The security of the RSA cryptosystem RSA , is related to the di culty o f integer factorization in the sense that discovering the secret key is as hard as factoring integers, although the actual cryptanalysis problem is potentially easier than factoring integers. Other methods, whose security relies on the di culty of factoring integers, include Rabin's digital signature method Ra79 and its variants e.g., Wi84 , the semantically-secure public-key encryption of GM82, BG84 , and the existentially unforgeable signature schemes of GMR85 .
The security of the Di e-Hellman public-key encryption scheme 1 is related to the problem of computing discrete logarithms DLP in nite elds in the sense that nding the secret key is as hard as computing discrete logarithms. Again, the actual cryptanalysis problem is potentially easier than discrete log computation. The digital signature method of El-Gamal El85 and its DSS modi cation DSS is also no harder to break than it is to solve discrete logarithms in nite elds. A similar paradigm to the above discrete log based schemes, can be carried out over elliptic curves. In that case, the underlying computational problem is the Elliptic Logarithm problem, to compute logarithms in the additive group of points de ned by elliptic-curves. The McEliece public-key encryption scheme Mc79 is substantially di erent from the above proposals, in that its security is based on a problem from algebraic coding theory. The security of this scheme is based on the conjecture that decoding with a random looking" linear code is as hard as decoding with a truly random linear code, and on the widely believed intractability o f decoding with random linear codes. In terms of e ciency, encryption and decryption amount t o a matrix-by-vector multiplication which takes time quadratic in the natural security parameter i.e., the dimension of the matrix. This compares favorably to the cubic time requires in RSA and the other number theoretic proposals above, yet the size of the public key is larger than in the case of RSA i.e, quadratic rather than linear. The best known cryptanalytic attack against the McEliece system takes time exponential in the dimension of the code, yet the security of the McEliece system has not been studied as extensively as the RSA system. No digital signature scheme based on algebraic coding theory has been proposed to accompany the public-key encryption scheme. 1 A straightforward modi cation of their earlier key-exchange protocol DH76 .
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In addition, there are general constructions of semantically-secure GM82 public-key encryption schemes based on any trapdoor function Ya82 . Interestingly, digital signature schemes which are existentially-unforgeable GMR85 , can be constructed based on any one-way function NY89, Ro90 , without need of trapdoor. Thus one may bene t from the slightly more extended variety of candidate one-way functions which, in addition to the above, include a candidate based on the conjectured intractability of decoding random linear codes GKL and Ajtai's recent candidate Aj96 which is based on the worst-case complexity of approximating the shortest vector in a lattice. Unfortunately, these general constructions for digital signatures i.e., of NY89, Ro90 tend to be ine cient.
The new proposal
In this paper we propose a new trapdoor one-way function relying on the computational di culty of lattice reduction problems, in particular the problem of nding closest vectors in a lattice to a given point CVP.
Starting with this trapdoor function, we derive a public-key encryption and digital signature methods, which are asymptotically more e cient than RSA and its variants, in that the computation time for encryption, decryption, signing, and verifying are all quadratic in the natural security parameter. The size of the public key, h o w ever, is longer than for the RSA system. Speci cally, for security parameter k, the length of the RSA public-key is k and cost of computation time is Ok 3 , whereas for the new scheme the public key is of size Ok 2 and the computation time is Ok 2 . Thus, our complexities are as in McEliece encryption scheme Mc79 . We feel that it is high time to reconsider the belief that shorter private and public keys are preferable to faster encryption and decryption time or signing and veri cation for signatures. In particular, space and communication costs associated with keys in Internet applications seem to be less restricted than envisioned for public-key cryptography applications 20 years ago.
Our trapdoor function. The idea underling our construction is that, given any basis for a lattice, it is easy to generate a vector which is close to a lattice point i.e., by taking a lattice point and adding to it a small error vector. However it seems hard to return from this close-to-lattice" vector to the original lattice point given an arbitrary lattice basis. Thus, the operation of adding a small error vector to a lattice point can be thought of as a one-way computation.
In order to introduce a trapdoor mechanism into this one-way computation, we use the fact that di erent bases of the same lattice seems to yield a di erence in the ability to nd close lattice points to arbitrary vectors in R n . Therefore the trapdoor information may be a basis of a lattice which allows very good approximation of the closest lattice point problem. Thus, we use two di erent bases of the same lattice. One basis is chosen to allows computing the function but not inverting it, while the other basis is chosen to allow computing the inverse function by permitting good approximation to the closet lattice vector problem CVP. For the sake of the introduction, we simply call such a basis a reduced b asis. In Section 2, we de ne a reduced basis to be one with a small dual-orthogonality defect where`small' is a parameter. Below w e give an informal description of our trapdoor one-way function which uses the above ideas.
The parameters of the system includes the security parameter n which is the dimension of the lattices that we w ork with and a threshold" parameter which determines the size of the error-vectors which w e add to the lattice points say, i n L 1 norm.
A particular function and its trapdoor information are speci ed by a pair of bases of the same full rank lattice in R n : A non-reduced" basis B which is used to compute the function and a reduced basis R which serves as the trapdoor information and is used for inversion. The reduced" basis is selected uniformly" and the non-reduced" basis is derived from it using a randomized uni-modular transformation.
The input to the function is a lattice point which is speci ed by a n i n tegral linear combination of the columns of B and an error vector whose size is bounded by . The value of the function on this input is just the vector sum of the two points. To i n v ert the function, we use a reduced basis R in one of Babai's nearest-vector approximation algorithms Ba86 to nd a lattice point which i s at most away from the given vector. The cryptanalytic problem underlying our scheme is to approximate the closest vector problem CVP in a lattice, given a non-reduced" basis for that lattice. A related problem is the problem of reducing the given public basis since one obvious attack is to reduce the given basis and then use the result for inverting the function. See Section 2.1 for a description of these computational problems in lattices.
From trapdoor function to encryption scheme. In order to use the above trapdoor function for public-key encryption, we n e e d a w a y t o e m bed the message in the arguments to this function. There are several ways to do that, and we discuss some of them in Section 4.2. Here we only describe one of them, in which the message is embedded in the lattice point.
The private and public pair of keys of a user are a pair of two bases of the same lattice of dimension n the security parameter. The public basis will allow encryption whereas the private basis is chosen to allow decryption. To encrypt a message we rst map it to a lattice point b y taking the integer combinations speci ed" by the message of the public basis vectors, and then add to the lattice point a small error vector" chosen at random. To decrypt, we look for a lattice point which is close to the ciphertext. By using the private basis, which is a reduced basis, the correct decryption is obtained with high probability. W e remark that our encryption algorithm is similar in its algorithmic nature to McEliece's scheme Mc79 .
Our signature scheme. Our signature scheme is similar to the encryption scheme. Regard the message as a n-dimensional vector over the reals. Then, a signature of such v ector, is a lattice point which is close" to it where closeness is de ned by a published threshold. The private basis is reduced so that nding close" points is possible. Verifying correctness amounts to checking that a signature is indeed a lattice point and that the message is close to the signature. It is important to remark at the outset, that messages which are close to each other will have the same signature. When applying the method in a setting where this property is desirable e.g., signing analog signals which m a y c hange a little in time, this feature is of great bene t. However, when applying the method to a message space where such property is undesirable, we propose to rst hash the message and only then sign it. This is good practice also in case that the scheme is subject to a chosen message attack, as otherwise being able to obtain di erent signatures of two messages which are close to each other when viewed as points in R n will imply the ability t o compute a small basis for the lattice which in turn will enable the attacker to nd close vectors in a lattice and break the scheme. Interestingly, a family of collision-free hash functions can be constructed assuming that Lattice-Reduction is hard on the worst-case see below.
Discussion
Our work was inspired by a remarkable result of Ajtai Aj96 who introduced a function which is provably a one-way function if approximating the shortest non-zero vector SVP in a lattice is hard on the worst case. Ajtai's work may be viewed as exhibiting a samplable distribution on lattices and proving that approximating the shortest non-zero vector in lattices chosen according to this distribution is as hard as the worst case instance of approximating the shortest non-zero vector in a lattice. Ajtai's construction, however, does not provide a trapdoor function and thus does not provide a way of doing public-key encryption based on lattice problems. Constructing such a trapdoor function is the novelty and focus of our work.
We remark that the construction of NY89 can be applied to the one-way function of Ajtai and thus yield a signature scheme based on the SVP problem. However, this construction is generic and thus quite ine cient. In contrast, the signature scheme which w e suggest based on the new trapdoor function is more e cient, and based on the computational di culty of the CVP. Alas, the distribution over CVP instances, induced by our construction, is not known to enjoy the hardness of the worst-case" property of Ajtai's result.
In retrospect, our encryption scheme bears much similarity to McEliece's scheme Mc79 . His scheme utilizes a pair of matrices over GF2, which corresponds to two representations of the same linear code. The encryption method is probabilistic: one multiplies the public matrix by the message vector and adds a random noise vector to the resulting codeword. Thus in both McEliece and our encryption scheme, encryption amounts to a matrix-by-vector multiplication and the addition of a suitable random vector to the result. However, the domains in which these operations take place are vastly di erent and so is the algebra. Another di erence is in the way the private-key is generated. In McEliece's scheme the private-key is a random Goppa code and has structure essential for legitimate decoding. In our scheme the private-key can be chosen uniformly and thus is structure-less" legitimate decoding merely depends on a property o f s u c h random choices. In both schemes the public-key is obtained by a suitable random linear transformation of the private-key; however, in our scheme the choice of this transformation seems richer. In general, we believe that McEliece's suggestion as well as ours deserve further investigation, especially due to the di erence in computational complexity required from the legal sender and receiver in these schemes as compared with the factoring DLP based schemes.
What can we prove about the security of our proposal? Since complexity theory has yet to produce a non-linear lower bounds for even one NP-complete problems, our proposal is essentially based on the failure of past research e orts to come up with e cient algorithms for the relevant lattice approximation tasks i.e., SVP and CVP. Using the best known algorithms for approximating the closest vector problem we show in Section 6 that a natural attack on our trapdoor function takes exponential time in the dimension of the lattice. In particular, according to our estimates this attack should be intractable in practice for dimension 200.
Drawing an analogy from the past, in proposing the RSA, Rivest et. al. RSA relied on the failure of past research to produce e cient factoring algorithms, but did not reduce factoring to the breaking of their proposal. By now, the assumption that RSA itself is hard to invert rather than factoring in general can stand on its own, as it has been subjected to much examination and scrutiny. The structure of our proposal i.e the key generation process is more complex than in RSA and requires stating a more complex assumption. Essentially, w e need to conjecture that for some natural distribution on lattices and bases for these lattices, the CVP is hard. We don't know if a result similar to Ajtai's can be proved for the distribution which w e propose over the CVP instances. Similarity, it is not known whether such a result can be proved for RSA. We hope that our suggestion will stir up further investigation into the complexity of lattice problems. 4
Organization
In Section 2 we review necessary material about lattices and lattice problems. In Section 3 we describe our construction of a trapdoor function and discuss various parameters and attacks. Section 4 describes our encryption scheme and Section 5 describes our signature scheme. In Section 6 we describe our experimental results
Lattices and Lattice Reduction Problems
Notations and conventions. In the sequel we use the following conventions: We denote the set of real numbers by R and the set of integers by Z. W e denote real numbers by small Greek letters e.g., ; ; etc. and integers by one of the letters i; j; k; l; m; n . W e denote vectors by bold-face lowercase letters e.g., b; c; r etc.. We use capital letters e.g., B;C;R, etc. to denote matrices or sets of vectors.
In this paper we only care about lattices of full rank, so the de nitions below only deal with those.
De nition 1: Given a set of n linearly independent v ectors in R n ; B = f b 1 ; ; b n g , w e de ne the lattice spanned by B as the set of all possible linear combinations of the b i 's with integral coe cients, namely
We call B a basis of the lattice LB. We s a y that a set of vectors L R n is a lattice if there is a basis B such that L = LB. If the vector v belongs to the lattice L, then we s a y that v is a lattice-vector or a lattice point.
Below w e brie y mention a few well-known facts about lattices. In the sequel we view a basis for a lattice in R n as an n n non-singular matrix B whose columns are the basis vectors. Viewed this way, the lattice spanned by B is the set LB = f B v : v is an integral vectorg. W e note that there are many di erent bases for any lattice L. In fact, if the set B = fb 1 ; ; b n gspans some lattice then by taking any v ector b i 2 B and adding to it any i n tegral linear combination of the other vectors we obtain a di erent basis for the same lattice.
All bases have the same determinant. The rst important fact about lattices is that all the bases of a given lattice have the same determinant. This fact follows since there is an integer matrix T such that BT =C and another integer matrix T ,1 such that CT ,1 =B.
The dual lattice Let B = b 1 ; ; b n be a basis for some lattice in R n , L = LB. Recall that we think of B as an n n matrix whose columns are the b i 's. The dual lattice o f L is the lattice which is spanned by the rows of the matrix B ,1 . Let us denote the rows of B ,1 byb 1 ; ; b n .
Orthogonality Defect The notion of of the orthogonality defect of a basis which w as introduced by S c hnorr in Sc87 plays a crucial role in the security of our schemes.
De nition 2: Let B be a real non-singular n n matrix. 5
Clearly we h a v e orth-defectB = 1 if and only if the columns of B are orthogonal to one another, and orth-defectB 1 otherwise. When comparing di erent bases of the same lattice in R n , w e really only care about the product of the kb i k's, since detB is the same for all of them and serves just as a normalization factor. In Section 3.5 we demonstrate the importance of the orthogonality defect to the security of our schemes. In particular we show that when we use a basis B for a lattice L = LB for our trapdoor function, the work load which is associated with a brute-force attacks on the scheme is proportional to the orthogonality defect of the corresponding basis for the dual lattice. I t w ould therefore be convenient for us to de ne the dual orthogonality defect for a matrix.
De nition 3: Let B be a real non-singular n n matrix. 
Hard problems in lattices
The security of our constructions is related to the conjectured intractability of a few computational problems in lattices.
The Shortest non-zero Vector Problem SVP. This problem underlies the security o f Ajtai's construction and our collision-free hashing. In this problem we are given a basis B for a lattice in R n and our task is to nd the non-zero vector in LB whose Euclidean norm is minimum. There are no known polynomial-time algorithms for solving the SVP, and it is also not known whether the SVP is N P -hard although a version of it, where the distance is measured in L 1 norm, was shown by v an Emde Boas Bo81 t o b e N P -hard. There are, however, deterministic polynomial-time approximation algorithms for the SVP. The LLL algorithm due to Lov asz, Lenstra and Lenstra LLL approximates the SVP in R n up to a factor of 2 n=2 in the worst case. This was later improved by S c hnorr Sc87 to a factor of 1 + " n for any " 0.
No polynomial-time algorithm is known for approximating the SVP in R n within a polynomial factor in n. Indeed such an approximation has been conjectured to be infeasible to achieve. Recently, Ajtai Aj96 described samplable distributions which form also a hard-core distribution" for the SVP. Namely, a n y probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which can approximate the SVP problem with a polynomial approximation ratio on random instances drawn with Ajtai's distribution, can be transformed into a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which a c hieves a polynomial approximation ratio on every instance of the SVP.
The Closest Vector Problem CVP. This is the non-homogeneous" version of the SVP. In this problem we are given a basis B for a lattice in R n and another vector v 2 R n , and our task is to nd the vector in LB which is closest to v in some norm. The CVP was shown by van Emde Boas Bo81 t o b e N P -hard. In terms of approximation, it was shown in Ka that any algorithm which approximates the SVP to within a factor of can be transformed into an algorithm which approximates the CVP to within a factor of n 3=2 2 . Combined with Schnorr's algorithm, this yields a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm which approximates the CVP in R n to within a factor of 1 + " n for any " 0.
As we explain in Section 3, an attack against our trapdoor function amounts to nding an exact solution for some instance of CVP.
The Smallest Basis Problem SBP. In this problem, we are given a basis B for a lattice in R n and our goal is to nd the smallest" basis B 0 for the same lattice. There are many v ariants of this problem, depending on the exact meaning of smallest". In the context of this paper, we care about bases with small orthogonality defect. Thus, we consider the version in which w e l o o k for the basis B 0 of LB which has smallest orthogonality defect. In out public key constructions, nding the private-key from the public-key requires solving some distribution over SBP instances.
For this problem too there are no known polynomial-time algorithms, and the best polynomialtime approximation algorithms for it are again the LLL and Schnorr's algorithms which a c hieve a n approximation ratio of 2 On 2 in the worst case for SBP instances in R n .
Worst case vs. average case. The upper-bounds above on the performance of the approximation algorithms are all worst-case bounds. However, for the security of our scheme we are more interested in the performance of these algorithms on the average". In fact, typically the LLL algorithm and its variants perform much better than the above upper-bounds.
The only known theoretical result about the di culty o f a v erage case" lattice problems is Ajtai's result which w e mentioned above Aj96 . As we explained in the Introduction, however, we could not directly use Ajtai's result for our scheme. We instead propose a trapdoor function and provide some empirical evidence to its security, b y testing the di culty of the distribution of lattice problems which is de ned by our scheme against some known approximation algorithms with various parameters. We describe these tests in Section 6.
A Candidate Trapdoor Function
In this section we de ne our candidate trapdoor function and analyze a few possible attacks against it. We start by reviewing the de nition of a collection of trapdoor functions De nition 4: A collection of one-way trapdoor functions consists of four probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms, Generate, Sample, Evaluate and Invert Generate. The randomized algorithm Generate takes as input the security parameter 1 n and outputs a pair f;t where f describes a function and t is a trapdoor information. There is a domain D f which is associated with every function f. Sample. The randomized algorithm Sample takes as input a function description f which i s part of the output of Generate and outputs a point x 2 D f . The random choices of this algorithm induce a probability distribution over the domain D f . Evaluate. The algorithm Evaluate takes as input a function description f and a point x 2 D f and returns the value fx. Invert. The algorithm Invert takes as input a function description f, the corresponding trapdoor information t and a point y in the range of f, and returns a point x 2 D f for which fx = y .
W e require that the Invert algorithm be successful with high probability, where this probability is taken over the random coin-tosses of Generate and Sample, and over the coin-tosses of Invert itself if it happens to be randomized. A collection Generate, Sample, Evaluate is one-way i f Evaluate is a polynomial-time algorithm, and for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the probability that A succeeds in inverting f -when it is only given 1 n ; f ; f x -is negligible. The probability in this case is taken over the coin tosses of Generate, Sample and A itself, and is measured against the security parameter which w as the input to both Generate and A. Namely, w e h a v e Pr f;x A1 n ; f ; f x 2 f ,1 fx = negligiblen where the probability i s t a k en over the choice of f by Generate, the choice of x by Sample and the internal coin-tosses of the A. w e s a y that a real-valued function is negligible in n, i f a s n gets larger this function becomes smaller than any polynomial in 1=n.
Our construction
Generate On input 1 n , w e generate two bases B and R of the same full-rank lattice in Z n and a positive real number . W e generate these bases so that R has a low dual-orthogonality-defect and B has a high dual-orthogonality-defect. We describe the generation process in details in Section 3.3. The bases B;R are represented by n n matrices where the basis-vectors are the columns of these matrices. In the sequel we call B the public basis" and R the private basis". We view B; as the description of a function f B; and R as the trapdoor information. The domain of f B; consists of pairs of vectors v; e 2 R n . Sample Given B; , we output vectors v; e 2 R n as follows:
The vector v is chosen at random from a large enough" cube in Z n . F or example, we can pick each e n try in v uniformly at random from the range f,n 2 ; ,n 2 + 1 ; ; + n 2 g . 2 The vector e is chosen at random from R n , so that each e n try in it has zero-mean and variance 2 . F or example, we can pick each e n try in e as , each with probability 1 
The Inversion Algorithm
In this section we show h o w can be chosen so that the inversion algorithm is successful with high probability. Recall that the inversion algorithm succeeds in inverting the function on c if using the private basis R in Babai's round o " algorithm results in nding the closest lattice-point t o c .
Below w e suggest two di erent w a ys to bound the value of , based on the L 1 norm and L 1 norm of rows in R ,1 . Both bounds uses the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Let R be the private basis used in the inversion of f B; v;e. Then an inversion error occurs if and only if dR ,1 ec 6 = 0 .
2 W e do not know if the size of this range has any in uence on the security of the construction. The value n 2 is rather arbitrary, and was only chosen to get integers of about 16 bits for the parameters which w e w ork with.
Proof: Let T be the unimodular transformation matrix T = B ,1 R. Then the inversion algorithm is v = T dR ,1 cc and e = c , Bv. O b viously, i f v is computed correctly then so is e. T h us, let us examine the conditions under which this algorithm nds the correct vector v. Recall We proceed to show the bounds on . In both the theorems below w e assume that each e n try in the error vector" e is chosen equal to , each with probability a half. We start by asserting that we can choose so that we never get any i n v ersion errors. By Lemma 3.1 above, we get an inversion error only when dR ,1 ec 6 = 0 , which means that j i j 1 2 for some i. H o w ever, since all the entries in e are equal , w e get for every i j i j = jr i ej = j X j ij j j X j j ij j 1 2 Although Theorem 1 gives a su cient condition to get the error-probability d o wn to 0, we m a y c hoose to set a higher value for in order to get better security. The next theorem asserts a di erent bound on , which guarantee a low error probability.
Theorem 2: Let R be the private basis used in the inversion of f B; , and denote the maximum L 1 norm of the rows in R ,1 by p n . Then the probability o f i n v ersion errors is bounded by Pr inversion error using R 2n exp , 1
1 Proof: We use the notations d; i ; i ; r i and ij as in the proof of Theorem 1. We rst x some i and evaluate Pr j i j 1 2 . Recall that i =r i e = P j ij j . Since for all j, j ij j = p nand j = , each with probability 1 2 , then all the random variables ij j have zero mean and they are all limited to the interval , p n ;+ p n . Therefore we can use Hoe ding bound to conclude that Using the union bound to bound the probability that any such i exists completes the proof.
Remark. The last theorem implies that to get the error probability below " it is su cient t o c hoose p 8 l n 2 n=" ,1 . In fact, the above bound is overly pessimistic in that it only looks at the largest entry in R ,1 . A more re ned bound can be obtained by considering the few largest entries in each r o w separately and applying the above argument to the rest of the entries. Alternatively, w e can get an estimate rather that a bound of the error probability b y using Equation 1 as if all the entries in each r o w o f R , 1 have the same absolute value. In this case is the maximum Euclidean norm of the rows in R ,1 so we get an estimate of the error-probability i n terms of the Euclidean norm of the rows in R ,1 . This estimate is about the same as the one which we get by viewing each of the i 's as a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance kr i k 2 where kr i k is the Euclidean norm of the i'th row i n R , 1 .
To get a feeling for the size of the parameters involved, consider the parameters n = 140; " = In this section we discuss various aspects of the Generate algorithm. We described in Section 3.2 how the value of can be computed once we h a v e the private basis R. N o w w e suggest a few ways to pick R and B. Recall that R; B are two bases for some lattice in Z n , where R has small dual orthogonality defect and B has a large dual orthogonality defect. Our high-level approach for generating the private and public bases is to choose at random n vectors in Z n to get the private basis and then to mix them so as to get the public one. There are two distributions to consider in this process A distribution on the lattices in Z n which is induced by the choice of the private basis R.
Once we h a v e the private basis R, there is a distribution which is induced on the bases of LR b y the process of mixing" R to get the public basis B.
To guide us through the choices of the various parameters, we relied on experimental results See Section 6. Below w e brie y discuss the various parameters which are involved in this process.
Lattice dimension
The rst parameter we need to set is the dimension of the lattice the value of n. Clearly, the larger n is, we expect that our schemes will be more secure. On the other hand, both the space needed for the key pair and the running-time of function-evaluation and function-inversion grow at least as n 2 . The lattice-reduction algorithm which w e used for our experiments is capable of nding a basis with very small orthogonality defect as long as the lattice dimension is no more than 60-80 depending on other parameters. Beyond this point, the quality of the bases we get from this lattice reduction algorithm degrades rapidly with the dimensions. In particular, we found that in dimension 100, the bases we obtained had a high dial-orthogonality-defect. At the present time, the best practical lattice-reduction algorithm" which w e are aware of is Schnorr`s block-reduction scheme which w as used to attack the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem, see Sc95 . We speculate that working in dimensions about 150-200 might be good enough with respect to this algorithm.
Distribution of the private basis
After setting the dimension, we need to decide on the distribution according to which w e c hoose the private basis. We considered two possible such distributions.
1. Choosing a random lattice": We c hoose a matrix R which is uniformly distributed in f,l; ; + l g n n for some integer bound l. In our experiments, the value of l had almost no e ect on the quality of the bases which w e got. Therefore we c hose to work with small integers e.g, between 4, since this makes some of the operations more e cient. 2. Choosing a rectangular lattice": We start from the box kI in R n for some number k, and add noise" to each of the box v ectors. Namely, w e rst pick a matrix R 0 which is uniformly distributed in f,l; ; + l g n n , and then compute R R 0 + kI. The larger the value of k is, this process generates a basis with smaller dual orthogonality factor, but it may also allow an attacker to obtain a basis with smaller dual orthogonality factor by reducing the public basis.
Generating the public basis
Once we h a v e the private basis R, w e should pick the public basis according to some distribution on the bases of the lattice LR. Since every basis of LR is obtained as B = RT for some unimodular transformation matrix T, then picking B when we h a v e R is equivalent to picking a random unimodular transformation". We tried two w a ys of generating these random unimodular transformations". Both methods work by m ultiplying many elementary matrices", of di erent forms. where the ?'s represent a n y i n tegers and the blanks represent zeros. The rst form corresponds to adding to the i'th columns an integer linear combination of the other columns and the second corresponds to adding an integral multiple of the i'th column to all the other columns. We t ypically chose the ? components at random from f,1; 0; 1g with a bias towards 0 speci cally, w e used Pr 1 = Pr ,1 = 1 = 7. This was done so that the size of the numbers in the public basis will not grow too fast.
An important parameter in this process is the number of elementary matrices which w e m ultiply together which w e refer to as the number of mixing steps". In our experiments we only used matrices of the rst form, and went through the values of i in order so as to make sure that we hit them all. Our experiments indicate that using 2n such matrices is su cient. Another possible type of elementary matrices are upper-and lower-triangular matrices with 1 on the main diagonal. We did very few experiments with these matrices. In these experiments we c hose the non-zero entries in L and U which are lower-and upper-diagonal respectively from f,1; 0; 1g. We found that we need to multiply at least 4 LU pairs to prevent LLL from recovering the original basis. Comparing the two methods, we found that for the same level of security", the second method required a basis B with larger entries. Thus we used the rst method in the most of our experiments.
One way t o k eep the entries of the public basis small using either of the distributions above is to LLL-reduce the mixed basis. This does not a ect the security of the trapdoor function since an attacker can do the same thing. However, when used in the encryption scheme which w e suggest in Section 4, there may be some advantage in keeping the entries in B not too small".
Bases representation.
To make e v aluating and inverting the function more e cient, we c hose the following representation for the private and public bases. The public bases is represented by the integer matrix B whose columns are the basis-vectors, so that evaluating f B; v;e = B v + e can be done in quadratic time. To i n v ert f B; e ciently, h o w ever, we do not store the private basis R itself. Instead, we store the matrix R ,1 and the unimodular matrix T = B ,1 R. Then, to compute f ,1 B; c w e set v = T dR ,1 cc and e = c , Bv, both of which can be done in quadratic time.
Representing B;T is easy since they are integral matrices, but R ,1 is not an integral matrix, so we need to consider how it should be represented. One possibility, of course, is to keep the exact values of all the entries in R ,1 . After all, the entries of R ,1 are all rational, and the number of bits it take to write them down is at most polynomial in the number of bits of R. This approach, however, is rather expensive in terms of running time. Although the entries in R are small typically, only 2-3 bits the determinant o f R is much larger about 200 bits if R is a 100100 matrix which means that we need to work with very large numbers in order to perform operations on R ,1 . A di erent approach is to only keep a few bits of each e n try in R ,1 . This, of course, may i n troduces errors. If we only keep`bits per entry then we get an error of at most 2 ,`i n each e n try.
Clearly, this has no e ect on the security of the system since it only e ects the operations done using the private basis, but it may increase the probability o f i n v ersion errors. Since we only perform linear operations on R ,1 , it is rather straightforward to evaluate the e ect of adding small errors to its entries. Denote the error matrix" by E = ij . That is, ij is the di erence between the value which is stored for R ,1 ij and the real value of that entry. Then we h a v e j ij j 2 ,`f or all i; j. When inverting the function, we apply the same procedure as above, but uses the matrix R 0 def = R ,1 + E instead of the matrix R ,1 itself.
Recall that the value of the function is c = Bv + e, where v is an integer vector and e is the error vector". Thus the vector v 0 computed by the inversion routine is v 0 = T dR 0 cc = T R ,1 + EBv + e = v + T R ,1 e + EBv + e where the last equality follows since R ,1 Bv is an integral vector so we can take it out of the rounding operation and then we h a v e TR , 1 Recall that all the entries in E are less than 2 ,`i n absolute value, and that the error vector e consists only of small entries e.g., for our parameters, the entries in e are always less than 10. Thus the contribution of the vector Ee can be at most 10 2 ,`i n each coordinate, so we might a s w ell ignore it. To e v aluate the entries in EBv, assume that we represent each e n try in the matrix B using k bits, and each e n try in the vector v using m bits. Then, each e n try in the vector EBv must be smaller than n 2 k+m,`i n absolute value. For example, if we w ork in dimension 200, use 16 bits for each e n try in B and 16 bits for each entry in v, and keep only the 64 most signi cant bits of each e n try in R ,1 then the entries in EBv will be bounded by 200 2 16+16,64 2 ,24 . T h us, a su cient condition for correct inversion is that each e n try in R ,1 e is less than 1 2 , 2 ,24 in absolute value as opposed to less than 1 2 which w e get when we store the exact values for R ,1 . Clearly, this has almost no e ect on the probability o f inversion errors.
Security Analysis
In this section we provide some analysis for the security of the suggested trapdoor function by considering several possible attacks and trying to analyze their work-load. We start with evaluating the work-load of a brute-force attack.
Brute-Force Attack
An obvious pre-processing step in every attack on this construction is to reduce the public basis B to get a better basis B 0 which can then be used to invert the function. Notice that the only feature of R which w e used when we analyzed the error-probability is that the rows of R ,1 have small Euclidean norm in other words, R h a s a v ery small dual orthogonality defect. If we can nd another basis with this property, then we can use it just as well. However, nding a basis with a v ery low dual orthogonality defect is assumed to be a hard problem.
Thus, we assume that even after the lattice reduction, the attacker still have a basis B 0 with a rather large dual orthogonality defect. 3 For the sake of simplicity, w e assume that the basis used by the attacker is the public basis B. T rying to use the basis B for inverting the function in the same manner as we use the basis R means that given the ciphertext c = Bv + e, w e compute B ,1 c = v + B ,1 e. Then we can do an exhaustive search for the vector d T o e v aluate the size of this search space for d, w e make the simplifying assumptions that each e n try i in d is Gaussian, and that the entries are independent. Based on these simplifying assumptions, the size of the e ective search space is exponential in the di erential entropy o f t h e Gaussian random vector d. Recall that the di erential entropy of a Gaussian random variable x with variance 2 is hx = 1 2 loge 2 . Since we assume that the i 's are independent, then the di erential entropy of the vector d equals the sum of the di erential entropies of the entries, so we get hd = 1 2 X i loge 2 kb i k 2 = n 2 loge 2 + X i log kb i k so the size of the search space is 2 hd = e n=2 n Q i kb i k = e n=2 n orth-defect B=detB.
Note that the term detB in the last expression depends only on the lattice and is independent o f the actual basis B.
Typical numeric values. In the experiments which w e performed in dimension 100 with = 2 evaluating this last expression on the LLL-reduced public bases resulted in typical work-load of about 10 70 2 230 .
Other Attacks
In this section we discuss other possible lines of attack against the scheme. One rather obvious improvement on the brute force attack which is described above is to use a better approximation algorithm for the CVP. In particular, instead of using Babai's Round-o " algorithm we can use the Nearest-plane" algorithm which w as also described in Ba86 . On a high-level, the di erence between the Round-o and the Nearest-plane algorithms is that in the Nearest-plane, the rounding in the di erent e n tries are done adaptively rather that all at once. One way to describe the Nearest-plane algorithm which is somewhat di erent than the way i t i s described in Ba86 is as follows: Given the point c and the LLL reduced basis B = fb 1 ; ; b n g in the order induced by the LLL reduction. We compute the representation of c as a linear combination of the b i 's, c = P i i b i , but we only look at the last coe cient n . W e then replace c with the point c 0 = c,d n cb n , and replace b n with a vector b n which is orthogonal to all the other basis vectors. Denote the new basis by B 0 = fb n ; b 1 ; ; b n , 1 . W e then apply the same process to c 0 and B 0 this time looking at the coe cient o f b n , 1 . We repeat this until we eliminate all the vectors from the original basis B. It is clear that if at each step we got the right coe cient then the vector which is left at the end is just the error vector e.
As was pointed to us by Don Coppersmith, this attack can be improved in practice in several di erent w a ys:
Instead of picking the vectors by the order which w as induced by LLL, we can pick them by the size of the Euclidean norm in the corresponding rows of B ,1 . A s w e showed in the analysis of the brute-force attack, this choice maximizes the probability that the coe cients obtained by rounding are really the right coe cients. We can apply a lattice-reduction procedure to the remaining basis-vectors after each iteration or once every few iterations. This improvement is particularly useful since the performance of the lattice-reduction algorithm improves rapidly as the dimension decreases. Also, we can round more than one coe cient at a time if there are several vectors for which the corresponding rows of B ,1 have small norm. If all the rows in B ,1 have a large Euclidean norm, we can apply an exhaustive search similar to our brute force attack to the few entries which has the smallest Euclidean norm. That is, we try to continue the same algorithm for each plausible setting of these entries. Since we only a few entries and we picked the ones with the smallest norm, we expect that the size of this exhaustive search will be rather small. To defeat this attack, we m ust make the dimension of the original lattice large enough so that all the rows in B ,1 will have large Euclidean norm. Although we did not perform extensive tests of this attack, the data that we h a v e so far indicates that when using LLL as our lattice-reduction algorithm, we need to do some exhaustive search e v en for dimension 120. It seems that when using LLL, this attack is infeasible for dimensions above 140. We still do not have data about the performance of this attack using better lattice-reduction algorithms.
Encryption Scheme
Our public-key Encryption scheme is based on our candidate one way trapdoor function in the usual way. That is, to encrypt a message we e m bed it inside the argument to the function, compute the function and the result is the ciphertext. To decrypt, we use the trapdoor information to invert the function and extract the message from the argument.
Recall from Section 3 that, in high level, our one way trapdoor function takes a lattice vector and adds to it a small error vector. In the context of an encryption scheme, we s a y that we`encrypt a lattice vector' by adding to it a small error vector, and the resulting vector in R n is the ciphertext.
To encrypt arbitrary messages, we specify an easily invertible encoding which maps messages into lattice vectors which are then encrypted as above. Decrypting the ciphertext amounts to solving a particular type of CVP instances which w as discussed in Section 3. In a nutshell, the Encryption scheme can be described as follows using the algorithms Generate, Sample, Evaluate and Invert from the description of our trapdoor function.
Generating Keys. On security parameter 1 n , run algorithm Generate1 n to get the triplet B; R; . We let the public key be B; and the secret key to be R ,1 ; T where T = B ,1 R.
Encryption. On input message s and public key B; , we rst apply some randomized encoding function v Encs to encode s as a vector v 2 Z n . W e note that this encoding is in fact the only component of the encryption scheme which is not directly implied by the trapdoor function construction. We discuss this encoding function in Section 4.2. For now, we let Enc; Dec denote a pair of public and easy to compute functions such that DecEncs = s.
Once we computed v, w e pick at random an error-vector" e 2 R n according to the distribution induced by the Sample algorithm from Section 3. We then apply the function f B; to v and e to get the ciphertext c f B; v;e = B v + e .
The operations involved in encrypting a message are therefore: 1 Encoding it as a integer vector; 2 Choosing a random vector; and 3 Performing one matrix-vector multiplication and one vector addition. Thus we h a v e a n O n 2 algorithm for encryption where n is the dimension we w ork in.
Decryption. To decrypt c we use the private key to invert the function f B; by setting v T dR ,1 cc. W e then extract the message s from the vector v by setting s = Decv. Decrypting a message amounts to two matrix-vector multiplications and one rounding operation on a vector.
Thus we also have a n O n 2 algorithm for decryption.
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Detecting decryption errors. One property of the above decryption procedure is that although there is a probability of error, it is still possible to verify when the message is decrypted correctly. This enables the legitimate user to identify decryption errors, so that it can take measures to correct them. Recall that we encrypt the lattice point p by adding to it a small error vector e, thus obtaining the ciphertext c = p + e. When we decrypt c and nd a lattice point p 0 which w e hope is the same as p, we can verify that this is the right lattice point b y c hecking that the error e 0 = c , p 0 is indeed small. For example, if we pick the error vector so that it never contains any entry larger than , then we can check that i in each component. Thus we get Fact 4.1: If the underlying lattice does not contain any non-zero vector with L 1 2 then decryption errors can always be detected.
Plaintext Awareness. It seems that our scheme enjoys some weak notion of plaintext awareness" in that there is no obvious way to generate from scratch a v alid ciphertext i.e., one which the decryption algorithm can decrypt without knowing the corresponding lattice point. Still this plaintext awareness is limited, since after seeing one valid ciphertext c, it is possible to generate other valid ciphertexts without knowing the corresponding lattice-points simply by adding any lattice point t o c .
Partial Information Attacks
In addition to the attacks on the underlying trapdoor function which w ere outlined in Section 3.5, there are types of attacks which only make sense in the context of encryption scheme. Namely, rather than trying to recover the original message itself, the attacker can instead try to extract from the ciphertext some partial information about the message e.g., the value of a speci c bit in it. On way in which such partial information attacks can be mounted against this scheme is as follows: If B 0 ,1 has rows with small Euclidean norm, then the attacker may be able to learn the corresponding entries in T 0 v, but this still does not seem to yield an estimate about any e n try in v. I t follows that in this encryption scheme, it may be useful to publish public basis which is not LLL reduced.
In any case, foiling the partial information attacks requires a careful design of the encoding scheme v Encs, so that partial information that can be revealed about v will not yield partial information about s. This is discussed next.
Encoding messages as vectors in Z n
In this section we discuss ways to encode messages as vectors in Z n . A s w e mentioned above, we would like t o h a v e an encoding scheme such that knowing a few entries in v exactly and knowing some rough estimate on all the other entries still yields almost no information" about s.
In choosing an encoding function, there are other parameters besides security which need to be considered. Perhaps the most important of them is to obtain high bandwidth: Since for every encryption operation we end up sending the vector c = Bv + e, w e w ould like to use as much o f this bandwidth as possible for message bits.
The Trapdoor Function Paradigm: Using hard bits. The rst approach is a generic one.
Since we h a v e a candidate for a trapdoor one-way function, we m a y use hard-core bits of this function as the message bits. In particular, we can use the general construction of Goldreich-Levin, GL84 which shows how and where to hide hard core bits in a pre-image of any one-way function.
This construction enables hiding log n bits in one function evaluation.
This approach has the advantage of being able to prove that it is impossible to even distinguish in polynomial time between any t w o messages, under the assumption that we started with a trapdoor function. The major drawback is in terms bandwidth, since we can only send log n bits at a time for one function evaluation. Moreover, since this approach is generic, it doesn't provide us with any insight which w e m a y exploit to increase the bandwidth.
Using the low-order bits in v. Another approach i s t o e m bed the bits of s directly in the vector v. Since an attacker can get an estimate for the entries in v, then it is clear that we need to embed s in the least signi cant bits of these entries. Also, the fact that the attacker may b e able to learn exactly some of the entries in v implies that we should not put any bits of s in those entries. Note that we know in advance which are the weak entries", since these correspond to the rows in B ,1 with small Euclidean norm.
We start by examining the simple case in which w e only use the least-signi cant-bit of each entry except for the weak entries". and pick all the other bits at random. Then, given an estimate i = i + i for the entry i , the attacker should decide whether the number in that entry was even or odd that is, whether the message bit is a 0 or 1.
If we assume that each e n try in i can be approximated by a Gaussian random variable with mean i and variance 2 kb i k 2 which is reasonable since i is a sum of n independent random variable which are all more or less the same", then given the experimental value i , the statistical advantage jPr i is even j i , Pr i is odd j i j is exponentially small in kb i k. Thus, if the Euclidean norm ofb i is large enough, then the attacker, who knows i , gets only a small statistical advantage in guessing the corresponding bit of s. I f w e h a v e a r o w o f B , 1 with very high Euclidean norm, then we m a y be able to use the corresponding entry of v for`message-bits. It can be
shown that the statistical advantage in guessing any of these bits is at most exponentially small in kb i k=2`. If the Euclidean norm of each individual row i n B , 1 is too small, we can represent each bit of s using several entries by making that bit the XOR of the least signi cant bit in all those entries.
Reducing mod 2 Notice that using only the least signi cant bits for the bits of s is really a linear operation, since we can write v = s + 2 r , where s is the f0; 1g vector with the message bits and r is a random integer vector. Therefore, when using this encoding we should consider attack i n which all the matrices involved are reduced modulo 2, and the attacker tries to compute the vector v mod 2. Namely, w e h a v e c = B v + e = B s + 2 B r + e , so when reduce the last equation mod 2 we get c = Bs + e mod 2. We can now compute the inverse of B mod 2 over Z 2 . If such a n i n v erse exists then denote it by B ,1 2 . In this case we get B ,1 2 c = s + B ,1 2 e mod 2. Notice, however, that e mod 2 is a random binary vector which is 1 with probability 2 , and so -for each e n try i of d = B ,1 2 e mod 2 -the statistical di erence j Pr i = 0 , Pr i = 1 j is exponentially small with n.
5 Signature scheme
In this section we describe a slight modi cation of our trapdoor function which is more suitable for a signature scheme, and provide an initial assessment of its properties. In this signature scheme, just like in the encryption scheme, the user uses its private basis B to nd lattice points which are close to some given vectors in R n . In this scheme, we sign a vector in R n " b y providing a lattice point which is rather close" to that vector. The public key for the signature scheme contains a public basis B for the lattice, and a threshold 0 which de nes how close should the lattice point be to the given vector. The choice of is discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Operation
The key-generation procedure amounts to the generation of two bases as in the Generate procedure of the trapdoor function and to the determination of the threshold .
Signature. To sign a message s, w e rst need to interpret s a s a v ector in R n . F or this we use some encoding function to get u Encs see Section 5.3.2. Then, using the private key R ,1 ; T w e apply the exact same procedure as for decrypting a message, namely compute v T dR ,1 uc. The vector v is the signature on s. The signing time is On 2 just like for encryption, provided that the encoding time is so bounded.
Notice that v is an integral vector, which w e view as a representation of the lattice point p = Bv. The reason that we expect p to be rather close" to u is that the representation of u as a linear combination of the columns of R is R ,1 u, while the representation of p as a linear combination of the columns of R is dR ,1 uc, and these two representations di er by at most a half in each coordinate. We discuss this further in Section 5.3.1.
Veri cation. To v erify a signature v on message s w.r.t. the public key B; , we compute the vectors u Encs; pBv, and check that the Euclidean distance between them is less than . Namely, the veri cation process consists of checking the inequality kEncs,Bvk . This process too takes time On 2 , provided again that the encoding time is so bounded. 18 5.2 On the analog nature of the scheme We note that because of its analog nature", our scheme has some properties which are very di erent than those of other known signature schemes. In particular, notice that if u; u 0 are two v ectors in R n which are very close to each other much closer than the threshold , then it is very likely that a signature on u will also be a signature on u 0 . This metric preserving" property suggests di erent signing procedures for digital versus analog data.
If we are signing digital data then we should make sure that a signature on one message could not be used to obtain a signature on another message. This can be achieved by the use of a good hash function" to hash the message before we i n terpret it as a vector in R n or, alternatively, a s the means to map messages to such v ectors. If indeed the hash function is good enough, it will ensure that even if two messages to be signed are close to each other at the outset, they will be far apart after being hashed and thus be mapped to di erent signatures. Note that the hashing and signing paradigm is what is necessary and in fact done in practice when using the RSA and DSA signature schemes. The reason is to ensure the di culty of forging the signature of messages related to those messages signed previously by a legitimate user a forgery which is otherwise easy in both the case of bare" RSA and DSA.
On the other hand, the metric preserving" property m a y useful when signing analog data such a s m usic, speech, images etc. In employing a traditional digital signature scheme to such data, the natural procedure is to rst sample the data so as to obtain digital representation of it, and next to apply the signature scheme to this digital representation. This procedure has the disadvantage of potentially mapping close analog signals to di erent y et close digital representations. In particular, minor changes in the either the sampling process or in the analog signal itself, may result in a di erent digital representation. Consequently, the signature may not be valid when the analog signal changes a little. Thus, a method such as ours, where the analog signal may be signed directly have an advantage of supplying signatures which remain valid or at least meaningful under small changes of the analog signal.
Note that the above discussion depends on the encoding of data as vectors in R n . Each o f t h e t w o settings calls for a di erent t ype of encoding. In the digital" setting we wish the encoding to scramble messages so to destroy a n y structure e.g., related messages should yield unrelated encoding. In the analog" setting we w ant the encoding to preserve the metric of the data space e.g., close analog signals should yield close encoding in R n . For further details see Section 5.3.2.
Various choices
In addition to the choices made for the process of selecting the private and public bases discussed in Section 3, there are two important c hoices to be made: Firstly, w e need to determine the threshold parameter , and secondly we need to determine the method of encoding data as vectors in R n .
Choosing the threshold
In this section we show h o w the threshold should be chosen so that the signature algorithm is successful with high probability, and in Section 5.4 we examine the e ects of the choise of the security of the signature scheme.
In the analysis below w e use the following notations. Let A be a basis for some lattice in R n . We denote by Round A u the lattice point which is generated from u by considering the representation of u as a linear combination of the vectors in B and rounding the coe cients to the nearest integers. That is, Round A u def = A dA ,1 uc.
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Consider now a random vector u 2 R n and we try to evaluate the distance between u and Round R u, where R is the private basis. Recall that conceptually, the lattice point Round R u is the signature on the vector u though the actual signature is the representation of that point w.r.t. the public basis B. De ne the error vector" e def = R , 1 u , R , 1 u that is, the i'th entry i in e is the di erence between the i'th coe cient in the representation of u as a linear combination of the vectors in R and the nearest integer. Then the distance between u and Round R u is just the Euclidean norm of the vector Re. Clearly, w e h a v e j i j 1 = 2 for all i, since this is just the di erence between some real number and the nearest integer. This immediately gives us Claim 5.1: Let R be the private basis used for signing and denote the maximum L 1 norm of any row i n R b y . I f w e set = p n=2 then the signing algorithm always succeeds with probability 1.
Proof: Denote d def = Re. W e can write the i'th entry in d as i = P j ij j where ij is the i; j'th entry in R and j is the j'th entry in e. Therefore j i j P j j ij j j 1 2 P j j ij j 1 2 and so
As for the trapdoor function, we m a y c hoose to set a lower value for to get a better security. We n o w describe an approximate analysis" which enables us to estimate the failure probability for lower values of .
As opposed to the situation with the trapdoor function, however, even these approximate estimates are not very good. Experimentally, w e found that we can set the value of to be about half the value which w e get from the analysis below.
Recall that the distance between u and Round R u is the Euclidean norm of the vector Re where j i j 1 = 2 for all i. Moreover, if u is chosen uniformly at random from a large enough box in R n then the distribution induced over the vector e is close to the uniform distribution over To see that, notice that if we c hoose u uniformly from the parallelepiped f P i i r i : 0 i 1 g where r i is the i'th column of R then the induced distribution on e is exactly the uniform distribution. Moreover, every large enough box i n R n can be viewed as union of many disjoint parallelepipeds like that, plus some left over" volume. As the volume of the box increases, the fraction of this left over" volume decreases. Thus, the induced distribution of the vector e gets closer to the uniform distribution.
Thus, to evaluate the distance between u and Round R u when u is uniform in some large box in R n , w e need to evaluate the Euclidean norm of the vector Re when e is uniform in , 1 2 ; + 1 2 n . We can write each e n try in this vector as i = P j ij j where ij is the i; j'th entry in R and j is the j'th entry in e.
Denote the largest entry in R by max , then each of the random variables ij j is distributed in the interval , max 2 ; + max 2 and has zero mean. Using Hoe ding bound we conclude that for any we can actually use threshold value which is about half of what we get from these bounds. In particular, for the setting above w e can set = 200 to get the error probability below 1 0 , 4 .
Encoding messages as vectors in R n
Recall that in the above s c heme, a lattice-point p is considered a valid signature on a vector v if the two v ectors are close enough". This means that the same lattice point p is valid with respect to many di erent v ectors in fact, all the vectors in a sphere of radius centered at p. This fact has two implications: On one hand, we can allow many slightly di erent" representations of the same logical datum" without e ecting the validity of the signature. On the over hand, vectors which represent di erent logical datum" must be very di erent from one another.
Signing analog data. As a simple example of an analog data, consider attaching a digital signature to a FAX document say, b y printing a bar-code containing the signature on the document itself. Clearly, in this case we cannot expect that the senders digital representation of the document will be identical to the representation obtained by the receiver after the document is printed. However, suppose that we could represent the contents" of the FAXed document using some small set of parameters, in such a w a y that Printing and re-scanning the document does not change its parameters very much; and Documents which contains di erent contents are represented by v ery di erent sets of parameters. If we h a v e such representation, we could use these sets of parameters to represent a document a s a v ector in R n . Consequently, it will be very likely that a digital signature on some representation of the document will still be valid even after the document w as printed and re-scanned. We will need to assume that such a representation will be su ciently rich in the sense that documents of interest will results in representations in a su ciently large box o f R n . Clearly, signatures are easy to forge if documents of interest are all mapped to a small region of R n and carrying the argument to an extreme, we de nitely do not want all documents to be mapped to within distance of the same lattice point. Furthermore, it should be infeasible to obtain a meaningful document which matches a random vector in this large box o f R n .
Signing digital data. When signing digital data, we do not have the multiple representation" problem as above there is a unique binary string which represents the logical datum. What we need is an encoding of binary strings as random" points in R n . W e m a y assume, without loss of generality, that the string has length n, since shorter and longer strings can be handled using well-known methods such as padding and collision-free hashing, respectively. So what we need is a mapping of f0; 1g n to R n which does not map two di erent strings too close to one another i.e., to within proximity . This is very easy to do. However, we w ant the range of this mapping to be su cient random" so that nding a close lattice point will be hard for these mapping-images.
Security of the Signature Scheme
To get some initial indication for the security of this scheme, we consider what happens when we try to execute the signing algorithm using the public basis B. Here we do not even have a n approximate analysis. Instead we conducted experiments to evaluate how close to the threshold we can get when using the public basis for signing. For the same setting as the typical numeric values" in Section 5.3.1, n = 140, max-entry in R = 4, we got distances which w ere all above 520
we tried 5 di erent LLL-reduced bases, 10000 signatures" for each basis. This suggests that for these parameters, picking the threshold at = 200 may be good enough to counter this attack, at least when using LLL as our lattice-reduction algorithm.
Experimental Results
We performed several experiments in order to measure the e ect of various parameters in the basis generation process on the security of our scheme. Since, as we described in Section 3.5, the security of the scheme is related to the dual-orthogonality-defect of the bases involved, we view the ratio between the dual-orthogonality-defect of the public and private bases as our measure of security".
Testing methods. For our experiments we used an implementation of the LLL lattice reduction algorithm due to the LiDIA group Li95 . In each experiment, we c hose a private and public basespair and evaluated the ratio between their dual-orthogonality-defects. We generated the public basis from the private one by mixing it as described in Section 3.3 and LLL-reducing the result. To gain some con dence in our results, we repeated this experiment several times for each setting of the parameters. For each private basis, we generated ve public bases and used the ratio between the minimum dual-orthogonality-defect of these public bases and the dual-orthogonality-defect of the private basis as the security-level" of this private basis. For each setting of the parameters, we generated seven private bases with these setting and considered the median security-level" of these seven bases.
Parameters. The parameters which w e tested are 3. How cube-like" is the private basis. Namely, w e generated the private basis as R = k I + randl for several values of k. Where I is the identity matrix and randl is a random matrix with entries in f,l; ; + l g . Below w e refer to this parameter as the`k-parameter' of the private basis. 4. How many mixing steps" are used to generate the public basis from the private one.
Generating the Private Basis
We rst measured the e ects of the parameters involved in choosing the private basis, namely lattice dimension n, range of integers l and cube-likeness" k. For each setting of k;l, w e tested dimensions 80 through 120 in increments of 10.
Entry size l. We tested the l-parameter settings of 1, 4 and 10, working with both random lattices" k = 0 and cube-like lattices" k = l d1 + p n e . The results of these experiments are summarized in Figure 1 . In all these experiments, we applied 2n elementary mixing mixing-steps" to the private bases and LLL-reduced the result to obtain the public basis See Section ??. As can be seen from these results, the l-parameter had no e ect on the security-level" of the bases which we obtained.
Cube-like" parameter k. The settings of the k-parameter which w e tested are k = 0 ; k= 1 2 l d 1 + p n eand k = l d1 + p n e .The reason that we express k in units" of l p n is that the expected length of a random vector in f,l + l g n is Ol p n. We tested these settings with l = 1 and l = 4. The results are summarized in Figure 2 . Varying the value of k had the following e ects Increasing the value of k increases the dimensions in which LLL can recover the private basis. For example, LLL could recover the private basis in dimension 80 when we set k = l d1 + p n e , but failed for the smaller values of k.
When the dimensions increase beyond some threshold, the ratio of the dual-orthogonalitydefect becomes much larger for large values of k. The reason is that the dual-orthogonalitydefect of the private basis becomes smaller since the private basis is more cube-like". In fact, for k = l d1 + p n e , the dual-orthogonality-defect of the private basis is already very close to one. On the other hand, the dual-orthogonality-defect of the corresponding public basis is not a ected by this change since beyond some threshold dimension, LLL fails to take advantage of the cube-likeness" of the lattice. Thus, the ratio between the dualorthogonality-defect of the public and private basis increases considerably.
How Many Mixing Steps
We also tested the number of elementary mixing steps" which w e apply to the private basis in order to get the public basis. In each elementary mixing step, we pick one of the basis vectors and add to it a random integral linear combination of the other vectors. In our experiments we c hose the coe cients of this linear combination from f,1; 0; 1g with Pr 1 = Pr ,1 = 1=7. To make sure that we replace all the vectors in the private basis, we m ust make at least n mixing steps. To make sure that we hit them all, we c hose a random permutation over f1; n gand picked the vectors according to the order in that permutation. To e v aluate how secure" is the resulting public basis, we LLL-reduced it and compared the dual-orthogonality-defect of the result with that of the private basis. In our experiments we tried 
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to make n and 2n mixing steps before the LLL-reduction. The results for 2n mixing steps with various parameters of the private basis are presented in Figures 1 and 2 . The results we get when we only make n mixing steps for l = 4 and k = 0 ; k = l d 1 + p n e are summarized in Figure 3 .
It can be seen that when making only n mixing steps on a cube-like lattice, LLL was always able to recover the private basis. Another problem with making so few mixing steps which is not re ected in Figure 3 is that the variance which w e get for each setting of the parameters is much larger than what we get for 2n mixing steps. In fact, although the median results for k = 0 seem to increase exponentially with the dimension, the minimum results are very close to one even in dimension 120.
